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“MAKING BAIL”: LIMITING THE USE OF BAIL
SCHEDULES AND DEFINING THE ELUSIVE MEANING
OF “EXCESSIVE” BAIL
James A. Allen*
Every day in the United States, thousands of people are waiting
in jail postarrest prior to any trial or conviction. Once arrested,
these individuals frequently face harsh conditions while they are
held for their first appearance to be assigned bail. Thousands of
individuals wait more than forty-eight hours to first appear in front
of a judicial officer who determines their bail conditions. Innocent
people––people who have committed no offense except that of being
underprivileged––are pressured into accepting plea bargains
because they cannot pay bail. Thousands remain in jail unwilling to
accept plea bargains or admit guilt but are detained nevertheless
because they are unable to afford their excessive bail amounts.
These people are often the country’s most vulnerable, most poor,
and most undereducated––and often minorities. These individuals
are often arrested for crimes of vice, such as being intoxicated in
public, or for petty crimes, such as driving with a suspended license.
Bail is assigned through algebraic expressions that are hard to
understand and in amounts even harder to pay. In an attempt at
judicial efficiency and standardization, courts have overly relied on
bail schedules while making those assignments. This frequently
arbitrary reliance on bail schedules has resulted in a failure to make
individualized bail determinations and has caused a rise in pretrial
detention. Overreliance on these schedules coupled with a lack of
guiding precedent from the Supreme Court has resulted in an
excessive bail epidemic. Arbitrary bail procedures in the United
States are now so perverse that they have vitiated due process and
a presumption of innocence and have defeated the purpose of having
an excessive bail clause in the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court
should take clear action to restore this fundamental right and help
end the United States’ e(cessive bail epidemic.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Kalief Browder was charged with grand larceny for
allegedly stealing a delivery person’s car, which was crashed during
a joyride in the Bronx.1 Browder told a reporter from The New
Yorker that he had watched his friends take and crash the car, but
claimed to have pleaded guilty because he thought he had no
defense.2 The judge placed Browder under probation but avoided
admonishing Browder with a criminal record by classifying him
under New York’s “youthful offender” status.3 Browder was
arrested again eight months later, just before his seventeenth
birthday, this time on questionable allegations of assault and
robbery.4 Browder’s judge set his bail at !3,000—an amount his
family could not pay—and Browder was sent to jail on Riker’s
Island.5
Seventy-four days after arriving on Riker’s Island, Browder
appeared before a judge and pleaded not guilty.6 The judge found
Browder to be in violation of his probation and detained him without

* Note, J.D. Candidate, 2018. This Note is dedicated to Judge James L. Watson
and Judge “Turn ‘em Loose” Bruce Wright. Also to Andrew McCarron, Jacob
Levine, Kenneth Gayle, Bill Lynch and the Lynch family as well as my family––
all of whom have bailed me out more often than I deserve; I thank them for their
inspiration in writing. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law
and Policy for their scrupulous editing and invaluable feedback.
1
Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law.
2
Id.
3
Id.; see generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 2006)
(defining under youthful offender procedure: youth, eligible youth, youthful
offender finding, sentence and adjudication).
4
Gonnerman, supra note 1. Gonnerman provides an in-depth look at
Browder’s multi-year confinement on Riker’s Island. Browder was held for three
years and then released without being tried for the alleged theft of a backpack. Id.
5
D. Marvin Jones, A Bronx Tale: Disposable People, The Legacy of Slavery,
and the Social Death of Kalief Browder, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV.
31, 32 (2016).
6
Udi Ofer, Kalief Browder’s Tragic Death and the Criminal Injustice of Our
Bail System, ACLU (Mar. 15, 2017) https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakfreely/kalief-browders-tragic-death-and-criminal-injustice-our-bail-system.
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the opportunity for bail.7 Browder remained on Riker’s Island for
three years, spending more than 400 days in solitary confinement.8
Browder’s case was eventually dismissed and the charges were
dropped, but at age twenty-two, suffering from depression following
his release, Browder committed suicide.9
While Browder’s story has been widely shared as a cautionary
tale depicting a tenuous U.S. criminal justice system, his story is
often told with a focus on the tribulations of solitary confinement.10
While solitary confinement is a serious issue which needs reform,
the root of the problem––what placed Browder in Riker’s in the first
place––was an excessive bail amount. Browder’s story is indicative
of a class of similarly situated inmates who deserve a reasonable
7

Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder,
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2017) https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2015/06/09/no-bail-less-hope-the-death-of-kalief-browder#.Rp3NfGfw8;
see
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(a)(v) (McKinney 2012) (stating “the court must, on
the basis of available information, consider and take into account [among other
considerations, the arrestees’] record of previous adjudication as a juvenile
delinquent.”).
8
Eyder Peralta, Kalief Browder, Jailed For Years Without Trial, Kills
Himself, NPR (June 8, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/06/08/412842780/kalief-browder-jailed-for-years-at-rikers-island-wit
hout-trial-commits-suicide.
9
Dana Ford, Man Jailed as Teen Without Conviction Commits Suicide, CNN
(June 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/07/us/kalief-browder-dead/; see
Peralta, supra note 8.
10
See, e.g., Barack Obama, Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement,
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barackobama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c38411e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html (discussing solitary confinement and
calling for criminal justice reform); Judith Resnick et al., Time-in-Cell: Isolation
and Incarceration, 125 YALE L.J. 212, 215–16 n.25 (2016) (discussing an
upcoming documentary about Browder, the inhumanity of solitary confinement
and the need to move our culture forward); Kory Grow, Jay Z Talks Kalief
Browder Doc, Inhumanity of Solitary Confinement, ROLLINGSTONE (Oct. 16,
2016),
http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/jay-z-talks-kalief-browderdoc-solitary-confinement-w443715 (discussing the inhumanity of solitary
confinement and the Kalief Browder story); Cf., Shawn Carter, Jay-Z: For
Father’s Day, I’m Taking on the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME (June 16, 2017),
http://time.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/ (writing an open-letter
discussing the impact of bail in Browder’s case and how it impacts indigent
arrestees’ presumption of innocence).

640

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause,11 in
addition to significant bail reform.12 While numbers vary, it is
estimated that over 450,000 people in the United States are detained
while awaiting their trial solely due to their inability to afford bail.13
Importantly, a majority of pretrial detainees are held at the
municipal or county level.14 While the federal government has
passed legislation to decrease pretrial detention numbers,15
municipal and county jails continue to overflow with defendants
who are held simply because they cannot make bail.16 Further
compounding the problem is the disparity across various counties
11

The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
12
See generally Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=0
(discussing the long-term damage bail inflicts on vulnerable defendants and the
need for reform).
13
Id.
14
Id.; see also VERA INST. JUST., L.A. COUNTY JAIL OVERCROWDING
REDUCTION PROJECT i, iv (Sept. 2011) https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/los-angeles-county-jail-overcrowding-reductionproject-final-report/legacy_downloads/LA_County_Jail_Overcrowding__Executive_Summary.pdf [hereinafter VERA INST. JUST.] (finding overpopulation
partially caused by low pretrial release); MARIE VANNOSTRAND, N.J. JAIL
POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING WAY TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY
REDUCE JAIL POPULATION 11, 13 (Luminosity in Partnership with the Drug Policy
Alliance, 2013), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/New_Jersey_Jail_
Population_Analysis_March_2013.pdf (finding 73.3 percent of the New Jersey
jail population to be detained pretrial and about 38.5 percent of the total
population to be held because they could not make bail).
15
Establishment of Pretrial Services, 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (2008).
16
Pinto states as follows:
[Of the 2.2 million people currently locked up in this country,
fewer than one in 10 is being held in a federal prison. Far more
are serving time in state prisons, and nearly three-quarters of a
million aren’t in prison at all but in local city and county jails.
Of those in jails, 60 percent haven’t been convicted of anything.
They’re innocent in the eyes of the law, awaiting resolution in
their cases. Some of these inmates are being held because
they’re considered dangerous or unlikely to return to court for
their hearings. But many of them simply cannot afford to pay
the bail that has been set]. Pinto, supra note 12.
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and states in how judicial officers determine bail amounts.17 This
disparity has been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s lack of
uniformity and guiding precedent.18
Legislatively enacted bail policies, particularly “bail schedules,”
have also contributed to the wide discrepancy in how pretrial bail is
assigned.19 Also referred to as “bail schemes,” these schedules
are procedural schemes that provide judges with
standardized money bail amounts based upon the
offense charged, regardless of the characteristics of
an individual defendant. These schedules might
formally be promulgated through state law, or
informally employed by local officials. They may be
mandatory or merely advisory, and may provide
minimum sums, maximum sums, or a range of sums
to be imposed for each crime.20
17

MATRIX OF STATE BAIL LAWS, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE (April 2010),
https://www.pretrial.org/download/law-policy/Matrix%20of%20State%20Bail%
20Laws%20April%202010.pdf. For further discussion, see infra Part II.
18
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). In the 225-year history of
the Court, they have granted certiorari for only these three challenges pertaining
to the excessive bail clause, all resulting in a split decision. See Salerno, 481 U.S.
739; Carlson, 342 U.S. 524; Boyle, 342 U.S. 1. While the Boyle court issued a
unified holding, Justice Jackson (joined by Justice Frankfurter) wrote separately
to express distinct opinions concerning the clause. See Boyle, 342 U.S. 1. The
opinions of Carlson and Salerno issued a five-to-four and six-to-three split
respectively. See Salerno, 481 U.S. 739; Carlson, 342 U.S. 524.
19
See, e.g.,17 N.J. PRAC., § 13:5 (2005) (implementing a statewide bail
schedule in place of varying municipal bail schedules and replacing a practice of
automatically imposing bail in the amount owed for a practice of assigning
monetary bail in a “reasonable amount” and “tak[ing] into consideration the
defendant’s individual circumstances.”); GLENN A. GRANT, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURT, REVISED STATEWIDE BAIL SCHEDULES/PERMISSIBLE USE OF
MONETARY BAIL SCHEDULES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/notices/2017/n170111e.pdf (reforming New Jersey state bail
schedules because of gross discrepancies across counties); MICHAEL R. JONES ET
AL., A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL AND THE PRETRIAL
PROCESS IN COLORADO’S FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 69–75 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.clebp.org/images/2009-02-19_Jeffco_Bail_Proposal. pdf (discussing
the variations between bail schedules in several states).
20
Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26
CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011).
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Even in jurisdictions with bail schemes that give explicit
discretion to judicial officers and pretrial service agencies (PSAs),
arrestees have alleged that arbitrary bail procedures have replaced
the courts’ obligation to make case-by-case bail assignments and has
resulted in a “wealth-based detention system.”21
This Note argues that courts have strayed from their duty to
make individualized bail determinations and consequently,
frequently impose excessive bail amounts. This Note suggests that
the current excessive bail epidemic in the United States stems from
a lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive bail clause22 and also suggests that lower
courts have misapplied what little precedent the Supreme Court has
set on this matter.23 Circuit courts and legal commentators have
acknowledged the lack of clarity and confusion that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation has provided.24 This opacity has caused a split
among courts and has left a gray area for legal practitioners in
understanding how much discretion legislatures and judicial officers
have in assigning bail.25 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
21

See, e.g., Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at
*1–4 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (discussing how indigent arrestees “allege that the Harris
County Police fail or refuse to comply with the Roberson order or the provisions
of the Texas Code requiring them to consider an arrestee’s inability to pay bail or
eligibility for release on terms other than the scheduled bail amounts at the first
hearing”).
22
See EDWARD S. CORWIN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 233 (12th ed. 1958) (“The Supreme Court has had little to say with
reference to excessive fines or bail.”).
23
Compare People v. Mohammed, 653 N.Y.S.2d 492, 502 (1996) (showing
how a New York court relied on Stack to hold that the “CPL does not require that
the court take the defendant’s resources into account”), with Martin v. State 517
P.2d 1389, 1394–98 (1974) (noting a court in Alaska reading no such limitation
from Stack v. Boyle and allowing indigence to be considered in factoring the
amount for bail).
24
See United States v. Gardner, 523 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1029 (2007)
(expressing a lack of guidance pertaining to pretrial release conditions); Broussard
v. Parish of Orleans 318 F.3d 644, 650 (2003) (stating, “[t]he Supreme Court has
not frequently considered the contours of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
of excessive bail. In fact, its application to the States has occurred only
indirectly.”); see also CORWIN, supra note 22, at 233.
25
Compare Zina Makar, Bail Reform Begins with the Bench, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/bail-reform-
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exercise its supervisory power and establish definitive precedent
prohibiting procedures which lead to the assignment of excessive
bail.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief history
and overview of bail practices in the United States. Part II discusses
current bail policies in the United States and compares various state
bail practices. Part III explores recent innovations from jurisdictions
across the States. Part III discusses the importance of a Supreme
Court determination on the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail
clause, identifies crucial steps local governments have taken to help
alleviate the excessive bail epidemic in the United States, and
provides recommendations to reform municipal and county bail
practices.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE
A. Origins of “Excessive Bail”
The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment has its
origins in the English Bill of Rights.26 The phrase the English used
in 1689 read, “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”27 The right was included in English law after excessive
bails were imposed by King James II as a method of indefinitely
imprisoning “politically disfavored individuals.”28 Monetary bail
originated as a surety that the accused would stand trial and as a
begins-with-the-bench.html?_r=0 (setting $550,000 bail for a nineteen-year-old
Baltimore juvenile held in adult jail although his GPS tracking records showed
the defendant was not in the vicinity of the crime when committed), with The Jinx:
The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst: Chapter 4: The State of Texas v. Robert
Durst (HBO television broadcast 2015) (depicting a credulous Texas court that
held multi-millionaire Robert Durst on a $250,000 bail for alleged murder which
he did not pay).
26
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 536–37 (1952).
27
See BILL OF RIGHTS 1 W. & M., SESS. 2, C. 2 (1689), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss1.html (emphasis added).
28
Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral
Question Does the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37
(2008).
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means to prevent flight.29 If a person fled, they were presumed guilty
and would forfeit their bail or property.30
B. Bail Traditions in the United States
The ambiguity of the English clause was imported into U.S. law
at the time of the country’s founding.31 Prior to the enactment of the
Eighth Amendment, various colonial charters instituted “right to
bail” and “excessive bail” clauses.32 Colonial founders incorporated
the English excessive bail clause into colonial constitutions as an
inalienable right.33 The Framers codified the federal right to be free
from excessive bail in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and in the Eighth
Amendment of the Bill of Rights later that year.34 The Supreme
Court did not interpret the clause until 1951 in the landmark case of
Stack v. Boyle.35 Since Boyle, the excessive bail clause has
29

See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes:
Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 517, 519–21 (1983).
30
Id. at 520–21 (explaining further that “those too poor to pay the ‘bot’ were
given over to the victim for execution or enslavement” (citing J. GOEBEL, FELONY
AND MISDEMEANOR 86–87, 92 n.89 (1976)).
31
Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to
Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 956 n.180 (discussing the ambiguity in the plain
language meaning of the clause).
32
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and The Right to
Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 337 (1982). Verrilli went
on to become the Solicitor General of the United States under President Obama’s
administration (2011-2016); Nick Gass, White House Announces Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli Stepping Down, POLITICO (June 2, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-verrilli-resigns-solicitor-general223820.
33
Hegreness, supra note 31, at 912 (“In state constitutions, from the
Founding through the Nixon era, the right to bail was automatic and inalienable
for all crimes not punishable by death.”).
34
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. (“And upon all
arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted except where the punishment may
be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit
court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall
exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the
offense, and of the evidence, and the usages of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
35
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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continually confounded the Court, lower courts, and state
legislatures.
1. Stack v. Boyle
Boyle remains the only Supreme Court case questioning an
excessive bail amount and arrestees’ bail assignment procedures.
The petitioners in Boyle were charged as Communists in violation
of the Smith Act.36 They argued that they were subjected to
excessive bail in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.37 The
District Court for the Southern District of California denied the
petitioners’ motion to reduce bail and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.38 The petitioners then filed
applications for habeas corpus and an alternative determination of
their bail with the Supreme Court.39 They argued that the procedure
used to assign their bail was unconstitutional because it did not
consider the defendants’ individual circumstances.40
In holding that the defendants’ bail was unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court noted that the bail amounts were exponentially
higher than those usually imposed for similar offenses.41 The Court
recognized that, “[s]ince the function of bail is limited, the fixing of
bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards
relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant [at
trial]. The traditional standards . . . are to be applied in each case to
each defendant.”42 The bulk of the eighteen-page Boyle opinion was
a concurrence by Justice Jackson who was joined by Justice
Frankfurter.43 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson stated that the use
36

Id. at 3.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 4.
40
Id. at 9.
41
Id. at 5 (“[B]ail [amounts] for each petitioner [had] been fixed in a sum
much higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties and yet
there [had] been no factual showing to justify such action.”).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 7–18 (Jackson, J. and Frankfurter, F.). Not only is Boyle the only
Supreme Court case analyzing an excessive bail amount and arrestees’ bail
assignment procedures, it is also the oldest and shortest. See Carlson v. Landon,
37
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of blanket bail determinations was a violation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 46(c) and agreed that each of the accused
were entitled to bail determinations based on their particular
circumstance.44 At the time, Boyle was considered a significant case
for arrestees’ pretrial rights, however subsequent decisions have
eroded this foundation.45
2. Carlson v. Landon
One year after declaring individual-by-individual bail
determinations to be the standard, the Court distorted its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause,
issuing a split decision in Carlson v. Landon.46 In Carlson, the
majority determined that the Attorney General could refuse bail to a
group of alien communists because of their potential threat to
society.47 The Supreme Court issued a divisive five-four decision
holding that the Eighth Amendment did not require that bail should
always be available.48 Carlson provided a blueprint of the popular
elements now considered by judges and debated by policymakers
when adjudicating or legislating bail including issues such as due
process, equal protection, and judicial discretion.49
This closely contested decision created confusion regarding the
correct interpretation of the excessive bail clause, shifting the
discussion to focus on whether the clause provided a “right to bail”
for crimes other than capital punishment.50 The decision also raised
questions regarding how much discretion nonjudicial bodies had in
342 U.S. 524 (1952) (forty-three pages); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (twenty-eight pages).
44
Id. at 9 (Jackson, J.).
45
Hegreness, supra note 31, at 960–69 (describing the Court’s complicity in
unconstitutional bail practices by upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as
constitutional).
46
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
47
Id. at 541–47.
48
Id. at 545–46.
49
See generally id. at 534–36, 542 (discussing the principles of legislative
discretion and due process).
50
See id. at 534, 540 (discussing whether a provision under the Internal
Security Act could allow the Attorney General to deny bail).
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legislating bail.51 However, it is important to distinguish the facts of
Carlson from the common facts of current cases which have led to
our excessive bail epidemic. Crucially, the Carlson plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the ability to be “continued in
custody”52 without being afforded the opportunity of bail,53 a
different claim than challenging an excessive monetary amount.
Additionally, the crimes that the Carlson and Boyle plaintiffs
allegedly conducted were far more egregious than those
characterized by most current excessive bail cases.54 Due to these
distinctions, Carlson is not analogous to the current cases causing
the excessive bail epidemic––cases frequently involving crimes of
poverty or low-level misdemeanor offenses. While Carlson is not
analogous to many bail cases causing the bail epidemic, courts
51

See id. at 543 (discussing the legislative scheme, which gave the Attorney
General, not a judicial officer, the discretion to deny bail in the context of
immigration).
52
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 533–34. Because the plaintiffs in Carlson were nonU.S. citizens their bail determination fell under the discretion of the Attorney
General through Section 23 of the Internal Security Act, which provides in
pertinent part:
[[p]ending final determination of the deportability of any alien
taken into custody under warrant of the Attorney General, such
alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (1) be
continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in the
amount of not less than $500, with security approved by the
Attorney General; or (3) be released on conditional parole].
Internal Security Act of 1950 § 23, 8 U.S.C. § 156 (repealed
1952).
53
Brief for Respondent at 5, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (No.
35), 1951 WL 81962, at *5.
54
See e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 WL 361612,
at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (showing that the defendant was detained six days
before a bail hearing for being under the influence in public). Compare Odonnell
v. Harris Cty, No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *8"(S.D. Tex. Dec. 16,
2016) (“According to a 2012 report, 81 percent of misdemeanor arrestees in Harris
County could not post bail at booking and were jailed. Most of the other 19 percent
could pay and were released on bond before or at booking.”), with Carlson, 342
U.S. at 528 (“The four petitioners . . . were arrested under warrants, issued after
the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950, charging each with being an
alien who was a member of the Communist Party of the United States.”), and
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (showing that plaintiffs were also arrested
for alleged affiliations with the Communist Party).
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continue to rely on it as precedent in assigning bail.55 To end the bail
epidemic, courts should lessen their reliance on Carlson when
assigning bail.
3. Bail Reform Acts of 1966 & 1984
The lack of cohesion from the Supreme Court and from local
courts across the country ultimately led to an attempt by Congress
to provide guidelines on setting bail via the Bail Reform Act
(“BRA”) of 1966.56 The BRA established that, when making a bail
determination, judicial officers should consider:
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against the accused, the
accused’s family ties, employment, financial
resources, character and mental condition, the length
of his residence in the community, his record of
convictions, and his record of appearance at court
proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings.57
The BRA was met with immediate resistance as critics viewed
it as limiting a court’s ability to detain potentially dangerous
individuals before trial.58 Although it was only imposed on the
federal courts, some states followed suit with similar statutes, while
55

See, e.g., Rendel v. Mummert, 474 P.2d 824, 826 (Ariz. 1970) (holding
there is no constitutional right to bail in all cases); In re Underwood, 508 P.2d
721, 725 (Cal. 1973) (“Our constitutional language expressly providing that all
persons shall be bailable except for a capital offense was consciously added to the
‘no excessive bail’ language adopted from the Eight Amendment in order to make
clear that, unlike the federal rule, all except the one class of defendants were to be
bailable.”); Aime v. Commonwealth, 611 N.E.2d 204, 211–12 (Mass. 1993)
(“Similarly, the government may detain a potentially dangerous alien if it makes
a particularized showing that the alien creates a threat to society.”); People v.
Melville, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671, 677 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (finding that there is no
absolute right to bail).
56
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-465 § 3146, 80 Stat. 214 (amended
1984).
57
Id.
58
See Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in
1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 24, 48 (1970) (arguing that the Bail Reform Act should
be amended to more easily allow preventative detention).
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others decided to craft statutes with a greater explicit focus on
dangerousness of the accused in the name of public safety.59
This disunity eventually led to the Bail Reform Act of 1984
(“1984 Act” T).60 The 1984 Act revised the BRA to allow courts to
impose conditions of release to ensure community safety.61 The
1984 Act provided:
the defendant must be released on their own personal
recognizance or unsecured personal bond unless the
judicial officer determines that such release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required or will endanger the safety of any other
person or the community.62
Prior to this revision, denial of bail was only permitted for the
most heinous crimes, such as capital offenses.63 Since the 1984 Act,
courts have been able to deny bail as a preventative measure.64
4. United States v. Salerno
The 1984 Act was swiftly challenged in 1986 in United States v.
Salerno.65 The Salerno petitioners challenged the revised clause in
the 1984 Act which added “potential dangerousness” as a
consideration for bail, claiming it was a violation of their Due
Process rights and their Eighth Amendment right to be free from the
denial of bail based on considerations other than the possibility of
flight.66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
59

Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-63b (West 2012) (mirroring the
federal Act, detailing broad circumstances that a court should consider), with GA.
CODE ANN., § 17-6-1 (West 2014) (deviating from the federal Act, introducing
circumstances geared toward detention pending trial).
60
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 202 (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-3150 (1988)).
61
Id.
62
Id. (emphasis added).
63
Verrilli, supra note 32, at 361.
64
Ann M. Overbeck, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of
1984, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 153, 166–72 (1986).
65
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
66
See Brief for Respondent at 1–3, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (No. 86-87). The topic of the Eighth Amendment right to bail as an
inalienable right, incorporating the right into the states, is an interesting one on its
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with the petitioners and struck down the provision, declaring it to be
facially unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process.67
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on
whether the 1984 Act was constitutional.68
In another split decision, the Court determined that the
petitioners failed to meet the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that
the “potential dangerousness” clause in the 1984 Act was facially
unconstitutional.69 The majority opinion, implying that there was no
genuine conflict among the Courts of Appeals,70 solidified a court’s
ability to refuse bail if the government establishes that the arrestee
“pose[s] a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community
which no condition of release can dispel.”71 Considered a threat to
the community, the Salerno petitioners were denied bail.72 Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist claimed,
own. For alternate views, compare Verrilli, supra note 32, at 354 (examining
incorporated rights through the “fundamental principle” analysis used by the
Supreme Court); with Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing that the
historical intention of the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to incorporate
the Bill of Rights). Most recently, the Supreme Court has expressed it as an
incorporated right, but only then through a footnote. See McDonald v. Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35, n.12 (2010); Samuel Wiseman, McDonald’s Other
Right, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 23, 24 (2011). It is important to note that recent
challenges making their way through the courts mainly argue due process and
equal protection claims surrounding bail procedures, not an Eighth Amendment
implied right argument. See, e.g., Odonnell v. Harris Cty, No. H-16-1414, 2017
WL 1735456, at *73–74 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017) (stating, “the court concludes
that this is not an Eighth Amendment case” (citing Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No.
H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016))).
67
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71–74 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d 481
U.S. 739 (1987).
68
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 n.1 (1987) (“We granted
certiorari because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the validity
of the Act.”).
69
Id. at 745.
70
See id. at 741 n.1 (stating, “[e]very other Court of Appeals to have
considered the validity of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial
constitutional challenge”).
71
Id. at 755.
72
United States v. Salerno, 631 F.Supp. 1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d,
794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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[t]he only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail
Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions
of release or detention not be “excessive” in light of
the perceived evil . . . [and] to determine whether the
Government’s response is excessive, we must
compare that response against the interest the
Government seeks to protect by means of that
response.73
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in his dissent, agreed
with Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of the prohibition of
excessive bail,74 but denounced the majority’s overall reasoning.75
Justice Marshall’s dissent accused the majority of denying
recognition of the important role that “the Bail Clause and the Due
Process Clause [have] in protecting the invaluable guarantee
afforded by the presumption of innocence.”76 The dissent’s
argument is more aligned with the historical connotations of the
excessive bail clause and with overall due process in the United
States judicial machinery. The majority’s argument imposes a
presumption of guilt, while the dissent’s opinion upholds a true
presumption of innocence.
Similar to Carlson v. Landon, it is important to distinguish
United States v. Salerno from the current rise in excessive bail
determinations. First, like Carlson, the petitioners were challenging
their right to bail, not challenging an excessive bail determination.77
Second, like the serious crimes alleged in Carlson and Boyle, the
petitioners in Salerno were accused of being high-ranking members
of the notorious Genovese mob family and key proponents of
organized crime.78 This is distinguishable from the petty crimes
characteristic of those being held on excessive bail across the
73

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754.
Id. at 762.
75
Id. at 760–61 (declaring the majority holding to be “an exercise of
obfuscation” and a practice of “mere sophistry”).
76
Id. at 763, 66–68. Justice Stevens did not join Justice Marshall’s dissent,
but agreed with his conclusion that “the provision of the Bail Reform Act allowing
pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness is unconstitutional.” Id. at
768.
77
Id. at 744.
78
Id. at 743.
74
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country today.79 Third, the Salerno opinion specifically refused to
address when pretrial detention may be so excessively long that it
would be “punitive in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”80
Challenges today pertaining to excessive bail frequently consider
how long arrestees are detained pretrial because of an inability to
pay bail.81 The Salerno opinion is also distinguishable because it
came at a time when crime rates had been on the rise, whereas today
crime rates are decreasing.82 This officially ended a period of an
implied right to pretrial release pending trial and spawned the
current culture of pretrial detention as states adopted bail provisions

79

See e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL
361612, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting a case where defendant was
charged with being a pedestrian under the influence and detained for inability to
pay $160 cash bond); Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL
7337549, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (noting case where defendant was charged with
driving with a suspended license and detained for inability to pay $2,500 bail
amount). The Sandra Bland case presents another example. In 2015, Bland was
arrested for a DUI. Bland was unable to pay $515 or 10 percent (plus a $15 filingfee) of her $5,000 bond, which had been set at such a high amount due to
delinquent parking tickets. Bland had just secured employment and intended to
pay back the delinquent parking tickets. Three days into her detention following
her DUI arrest, Bland was found to have committed suicide in a Texas jail. See
Leon Neyfakh, Why Was Sandra Bland Still in Jail?, SLATE (July 23, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/07/sandra_bland_is
_the_bail_system_that_kept_her_in_prison_unconstitutional.html (last visited on
May 26, 2017); Debbie Nathan, What Happened to Sandra Bland?, THE NATION
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-happened-to-sandrabland/ (last visited May 26, 2017).
80
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 769 n.4 (1987).
81
Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 WL 361612, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (detailing delayed process in arrestees’ first appearance);
Odonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 16, 2016) (detailing arrestees held solely because they could not pay).
82
See John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Elliot Currie Interview, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/interviews/currie.htm (last visited May 26, 2017); Matt
Ford, What Caused the Great Crime Decline in the U.S.?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/what-caused-thecrime-decline/477408/.
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that do not require judges to impose the least restrictive bail
conditions on arrestees.83
II. CURRENT BAIL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
After Salerno, states were apt to amend their bail statutes to
mirror the federal policy established by the Supreme Court and
detailed by the 1984 Act, allowing more arrestees to be detained
because of potential dangerousness.84 These statutory changes were
ushered in during an era that saw a rise in tough-on-crime laws and
legislators.85 The use of pretrial detention grew86 and judges felt
83

Overbeck, supra note 66; Chalmous G. Reemes, Case Note, United States
v. Salerno: The Validation of Preventative Detention and the Denial of a
Presumed Constitutional Right to Bail, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 697 (detailing how the
decision eroded previous liberties to be detained pretrial).
84
See generally BARBARA GOTTLIEB, PUBLIC DANGER AS A FACTOR IN
PRETRIAL RELEASE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS 17–20 (1985)
(exploring the various state responses to awarding bail based on pretrial danger);
Hegreness, supra note 31, at 916, 964 (declaring, “[t]he frequency of the clause
falls from 80% of state constitutions in 1978 to 48% in 1998.” Also noting that
from 1776 to 1976, “[m]ore than 41 states protected this right by constitution (48
by constitution or statute), far more than the three quarters required for a
constitutional amendment.”).
85
See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocentpeople-plead-guilty/ (showing that “in response “to rising crime rates,” New York
passed the “Rockefeller Laws” in 1973 that “dictated a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment for selling just two ounces (or possessing
four ounces) of heroin, cocaine, or marijuana”); see also Ta-Nehisi Coates,
Moynihan, Mass Incarceration, and Responsibility, ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/moynihan-massincarceration-and-responsibility/407131/ (“In 1994, Congress passed the Violent
Crime and Law Enforcement Act, the largest crime bill passed in American
history. The 1994 Crime Bill, as it has come to be known, is also arguably the
federal government’s greatest contribution to the moral catastrophe of mass
incarceration. It literally funded it. The law funneled money into states that built
more prisons and took up ‘truth in sentencing’ laws that lengthened time served.
It had the perverse effect of encouraging the growth of prisons.”).
86
See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: MISUSE
OF JAILS IN AMERICA, VERA INST. JUST. (Feb. 2015) (describing jails as “massive
warehouses primarily for those too poor to post even low bail or too sick for
existing community resources to manage.”).
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public pressure to use their bail setting discretion in a manner that
would deter crime and keep alleged criminals off the street.87 With
increasing frequency, the elements a judge would use to set bail88

87

See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can
Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for
Unpopular Decisions? 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 320 (1997) (“New York politicians
have frequently castigated judges for their decisions on bail.”); United Press Int’l,
An Ex-Convict Held in Slaying Is Freed by Judge Wright, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23,
1973),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1973/12/23/91063508.html?pa
geNumber=25; Robert D. McFadden, Bruce McM. Wright, Erudite Judge Whose
Bail Rulings Caused an Uproar, Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2005)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/26/nyregion/bruce-mcm-wright-erudite-judgewhose-bail-rulings-caused-an-uproar.html?_r=0 (eulogizing a New York judge
who was nicknamed “Turn ‘em Loose Bruce” because he would traditionally
assign what he believed was reasonable bail). Despite the criticism, Judge Wright
remained adamant about his bail assignment practices, claiming just before he
retired,
I have never changed my mind about the Eighth
Amendment . . . [t]o say that I would’ve done things
differently means to me I would have been a good boy, kept
my mouth shut and availed myself of the benefits of the
system. I don’t think I can do that. I don’t think I could ever
do that. Id.
88
Common-law bail considerations for judges are largely subjective. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. (46)(c) (noting judge’s discretion and setting forth subjective
balancing considerations). In 1951, the Supreme Court referred to these elements
as broadly as, “having regard to the nature and circumstance of the offense, and
of the evidence, and to the usages of law.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951).
In 1987, after the BRA was revised to include the considerations of
dangerousness, courts shifted their analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (“To determine whether the Government’s response is
excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government
seeks to protect by means of that response.”); Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477
F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To determine whether the Excessive Bail Clause
has been violated, we look to the valid state interests bail is intended to serve for
a particular individual and judge whether bail conditions are excessive for the
purpose of achieving those interests.”). The Galin court also clarified that, “[t]he
state may not set bail to achieve invalid interests . . . nor in an amount that is
excessive in relation to the valid interests it seeks to achieve.” Galen, 477 F.3d at
660.
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were replaced with procedural, formalistic state bail schedules.89
Bail schedules and other bail schemes are now used in various
criminal proceedings across the United States in an attempt at
uniformity and a streamlined method of pretrial release.90 Though
valiant in their attempt to unify courts and provide an expedited
manner of release, bail schedules have had an adverse result on poor,
often minority arrestees, and have been characterized as an arrest
fine or tax.91
Additionally, these procedural schemes are now executed in
starkly different manners across states, and their varying results
have raised several policy concerns. First, mandatory bail statutes—
particularly those which are legislatively enacted—have been
criticized for possibly interfering with a judicial officer’s discretion
in assigning accurate bail amounts.92 Second, an inability to pay bail
assigned by mandatory or strictly followed schedules has led to
more pretrial detention.93 Furthermore, it has been argued that these

89

Carlson, supra note 20, at 13–14 (“Despite the clear legal emphasis on the
importance of individualized bail determinations, many U.S. jurisdictions have
nevertheless adopted a particular device that represents the antithesis of bail fixed
according to the personal characteristics and circumstances of each defendant: the
bail schedule.”).
90
Id. at 15; see also Assemb. B. 1118, 2015 Leg., Reg Sess. (Cal. 2015);
Oklahoma County Bail Procedures More Strict, OKLAHOMAN (1982),
http://newsok.com/article/1998190 (claiming the neighboring county had an
absurd policy because they would release those who could not afford bail).
91
Carlson, supra note 20, at 14.
92
Id. at 15
93
Compare VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14, at iv. (finding low pretrial
release numbers), and VANNOSTRAND, supra note 14, at 13 (finding gross
overpopulation in N.J. jails due to bail procedures), with Ann E. Marimow, When
it Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions do it D.C.’s Way, WASH.
POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/whenit-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcsway/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html (detailing
the procedures in D.C. courts aimed at progressing pretrial release). But see Simon
Ford, Haines Borough Police Dep’t Report (Feb. 23, 2014), in HAINES BOROUGH
ASSEMBLY MEETING #265 AGENDA 202, 203 (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.hainesalaska.gov/sites/default/files/fileattachments/borough_assemb
ly/meeting/1005/ba-3-11-2014.pdf (discussing an interim police chief’s
recommendation of blanket bail as a stream of revenue).
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bail schedules are being followed arbitrarily, resulting in a greater
adverse impact on indigent individuals.94
Pretrial detention solely due to an individual’s inability to pay
unreasonable monetary bail implicates equal protection and due
process concerns, and potentially violates the fundamental
presumption of innocence inherent in our criminal justice system.95
States have implemented an assortment of policies attempting to
mitigate these concerns, but these policies are not without
accompanying legal challenges.96
A. Georgia Model
Georgia and the states that follow its example set mandatory
minimum bail amounts for felonies and allow counties to create
similar bail schedules for misdemeanors97 to “promote uniformity
and fairness, and to facilitate and ensure the early setting of
bond[s].”98 Proponents of such mandatory bail schedules often
94

See e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL
361612, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting a case where defendant was
detained six days before a bail hearing for being under the influence in public);
Odonnell v. Harris Cty, No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549 (2016) (noting a case
where defendant detained unable to pay bail while driving on a suspended
license); Carlson, supra note 20, at 17 (referencing the ABA as declaring bail
schedules to be arbitrary and inflexible).
95
See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (stating, “[u]nless this
right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning”); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 554 (1952) (discussing how the discretion to jail someone without bail is a
serious one, the Court declared, “[d]elegating and redelegating this dangerous
power to subordinates entrusted with duties like those of deputy sheriffs and
policemen raises serious procedural due process questions.”).
96
See generally Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205 (Haw. 1993) (citing an
appeal reversing a trial court judge who believed she would not need to make a
finding if she did not deviate from the bail schedule); Walker, 2016 WL 361612,
at *1 (plaintiff alleging he was held solely because he could not pay the minimum
bail schedule); Odonnell, 2016 WL 7337549 at *1 (declaring Harris County’s
post-arrest procedures create a “wealth-based detention system”).
97
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9935-109 (West 2014); OKLAHOMAN, supra note 90.
98
MEMORANDUM FROM JEFFREY S. BAGLEY, JUDGE, STATE COURT OF
FORSYTH CTY., TO ALL SHERIFFS, JAILERS, CUSTODIANS OF PRE-TRIAL
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highlight the expediency they provide, arguing that by having a
schedule in place, defendants do not need to wait for a trial court to
rule on their bail amount.99 Similarly, proponents argue that the
uniformity of the bail schedule is fair because it provides defendants
with expectations of their bail amount and assigns bail based on
similar offenses.100
However, the Georgia model is directly at odds with the
Supreme Court’s guidance to make bail determinations based on
individual circumstances.101 Additionally, the expediency argument
is often in contrast with bail assignments that set a minimum amount
unattainable to a defendant strictly because of their disadvantaged
financial situation.102 Finally, because these bail schedules have
been evoked so strictly, the Georgia model has also been criticized
as a violation of judicial discretion by usurping the judicial officer’s
DETENTION FACILITIES, SOLICITORS GENERAL, MAGISTRATES AND PRE-TRIAL
OFFICERS (July 9, 1998), http://www.ninthdistrict.net/Bell_Forsyth/bfiop9828.pdf (discussing the Bond Schedule O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(f) pursuant to the
Internal Operating Procedure 98-98 in the State of Georgia).
99
See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 WL
361612, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (showing that “[t]he purpose is to permit
the posting of bail without a delay associated with the ‘First Appearance’ within
48 hours of being confined to [jail]. It is the opinion of the Court that the employ
of such a schedule, as authorized by state law, ‘provides speedy and convenient
release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements’”).
100
See Reply Brief of Appellant City of Calhoun at 16, Walker v. City of
Calhoun (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-10521), 2016 WL 929750.
101
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (concurring, Jackson, J. joined
by Frankfurter, F.) (stating,
It is complained that the District Court fixed a uniform blanket
bail chiefly by consideration of the nature of the accusation and
did not take into account the difference in circumstances
between different defendants. If this occurred, it is a clear
violation of Rule 46(c). Each defendant stands before the bar of
justice as an individual.). Id.
showing that Justice Jackson believed that uniform bail requirements were
contrary to federal standards in criminal justice proceedings).
102
See e.g., Walker, at *4 (detailing Georgia’s code which requires detention
if an arrestee cannot pay until their First Appearance which is supposed to be
within forty-eight hours); Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas, No. H-16-1414, 2016
WL 7337549, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016) (detailing arrestees held solely
because they could not pay).
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opportunity to assign an appropriate bail amount.103 These types of
blanket bail determinations clearly interfere with a judge’s
discretion to assign bail, and followed strictly, are a violation of
constitutional rights to be free from excessive bail.
B. California Model
To avoid interfering with a judicial officer’s bail assignment
discretion, other states, such as California, provide bail schedules
but are explicit in their deference to the judicial officer’s assigned
amount.104 These bail schedules typically provide a maximum
amount, but do not assign minimums, leaving the final assigned
amount to the judicial officer’s discretion.105 In such states, similar
arguments are made in favor of uniformity, expectation of expenses,
and a judicially efficient process for release.106
Critics of these methods have focused on how the theoretical
benefits provided by bail schedules have receded into a tangible
disadvantage impacting traditionally vulnerable communities,
resulting in an alleged “wealth-based detention system.”107 The
California method has also caused confusion among administrators.
103

See Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the
“trial judge abused her discretion by following the [bail] schedule without
considering relevant statutory criteria.”).
104
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 2016); JONES ET AL., A PROPOSAL
TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL AND THE PRETRIAL PROCESS IN
COLORADO’S FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 69–75 (Feb. 2009), http://www
.clebp.org/images/2009-02-19_Jeffco_Bail_Proposal.pdf.
105
See FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE, SUPERIOR CT. CAL. CTY. L.A. (2017),
https://www.lacourt.org/division/criminal/pdf/felony.pdf [hereinafter FELONY
BAIL SCHEDULE]; UNIF. BAIL SCHEDULE (FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR),
SUPERIOR CT. CAL. CTY. ORANGE (2017), http://www.occourts.org/directory
/criminal/felonybailsched.pdf.
106
For example, see legislative comments to Assemb. B. 1118, 2014 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2014), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1101-1150/
ab_1118_cfa_20140623_104909_sen_comm.html.
107
Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas 2017 WL 1735456 at *89 (declaring,
“Harris County’s policy is to detain indigent misdemeanor defendants before trial,
violating equal protection rights against wealth-based discrimination and
violating due process protections against pretrial detention without proper
procedures or an opportunity to be heard”). See infra Section III.A.1.
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For example, in 2015, the California Assembly pushed for a statewide bail schedule because bail determinations for similar offenses
varied so drastically by county.108 Furthermore, bail reform
advocates have identified counterarguments to those claiming bail
schedules are positive for judicial economy, pointing to the higher
monetary cost of detaining a person pretrial rather than providing
pretrial surveillance.109
C. Texas Model
A third class of states have implemented bail statutes and
procedures like those in Texas. In such states, there is a similar
attempt to avoid interference with a judicial officer’s discretion.
Though prescribed in a consent decree, these bail practices fall in
the category of “informally enacted by local officials.”110 For
example, a recent Texas case, Odonnell v. Harris County, Texas,
analyzed the bail procedures of Texas’s largest municipal jail and
county court.111 Harris County sets and modifies bail according to a
consent decree from a federal judgment in Roberson v.
Richardson.112 The Roberson order, requires judicial officers to “set
the amount of bail required of the accused for release and determine
the accused’s eligibility for release on personal bond or alternatives

108

Assemb. B. 1118, 2014 S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014)
(“[W]hen one county raises the bail amounts the counties near them often feel
pressure to follow suit.”).
109
See VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14. See generally, Marcia Johnson &
Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Overcrowded
Jails, the Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris County,
Texas, 7 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 42, 80 (2012) (discussing how monitoring and
other efforts can lower pretrial detention numbers); Supervision Costs
Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System, USCOURTS.GOV (2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-lessincarceration-federal-system [hereinafter Supervision Costs] (reflecting an
extremely lower cost in pretrial monitoring).
110
Carlson, supra, note 20, at 13.
111
Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas 2017 WL 1735456.
112
Rule 9. Setting and Modifying Bail, HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS
at 15–16 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ccl.hctx.net/attorneys
/BailSchedule.pdf.
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to prescheduled bail amounts.”113 The Roberson consent decree
requires judges and hearing officers to consider a number of criteria
and then determine bail.114 Under the Roberson order, one of the
criteria to be considered is “the ability to make bail,”115 but judges
have disproportionately outweighed this factor in favor of others.116
Ultimately, Hearing Officers in Harris County followed the
prescheduled bail amount in 88.9% of misdemeanor cases.117
These states are praised at least for their requirement to have
courts enact the bail schedules and not the legislature. For example,
the state of Ohio allows county courts to fix bail based on the
surrounding circumstances of a case or “in accordance with a
schedule previously fixed by the judge or magistrate.”118 Similarly,
Alabama revised its bail statute in January 2017 to allow county
judges to consider an individual’s financial condition.119 This
revision came after the absence of the clause in an Alabama county
statute was challenged for violating the Eighth Amendment.120 In
response, an Alabama court made clear that the use of blanket
schedules without regarding a defendant’s indigence would be
unconstitutional.121 This is a step in the right direction, but any

113

Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas 2017 WL 1735456, at *13 (quoting Pugh
v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)). For a more in-depth discussion of
the “Roberson order” derived from Roberson v. Richardson, see id. at *13–15.
114
Id. at 13–14; Rule 4. Initial Settings, HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS
at 9–10 (Sept. 6, 2012).
115
Odonnell at 14.
116
Id. at 35 (“The Hearing Officers testified that they cannot let one factor—
the inability to pay—control their bail determination. But they frequently cite only
one factor—criminal history—as controlling their decision to set secured money
bail that the defendant clearly cannot pay.”).
117
Id. at 32.
118
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.23 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
119
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(B).
120
See Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34–MHT 2015 WL 5387219
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015).
121
See id. at 4 (The new standard the court announces is that, “[t]he use of a
secured bail schedule to detain a person after arrest, without a hearing on the
merits that meets the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the
person’s indigence and the sufficiency of the bail setting, is unconstitutional as
applied to the indigent. Without such a hearing, no person may, consistent with
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dollar-amount bail schedule still detracts from a judicial officer’s
discretion.
D. Case-by-Case Model
Though the Texas model is a valiant effort, other states’ bail
procedures are more aligned with the Supreme Court’s
individualized bail determination standard and the essence of
judicial officer discretion. These states typically do not establish bail
schedules and instead use general clauses to assign bail based on a
set of transcribed circumstances.122 One such example is New York.
New York’s bail provision does not adopt a bail schedule, but offers
a discretionary standard for a judicial officer which provides a
number of criteria to assess in making bail determinations:
With respect to [the arrestee], the court must consider
the kind and degree of control or restriction that is
necessary to secure his court attendance when
required. In determining that matter, the court must,
on the basis of available information, consider and
take into account% (i) The [arrestee’s] character,
reputation, habits and mental condition; (ii) His
employment and financial resources; and (iii) His
family ties and the length of his residence if any in
the community; and (iv) His criminal record if any;
and (v) His record of previous adjudication as a
juvenile delinquent . . . or, of pending cases where
fingerprints are retained . . . or a youthful offender, if
any; and (vi) His previous record if any in responding
to court appearances when required or with respect
to flight to avoid criminal prosecution . . . . 123
These statues are typically broadly construed, allowing judges
to weigh a multitude of surrounding circumstances in case-by-case
determinations.124 While providing judges with ultimate discretion,
the Fourteenth Amendment, continue to be held in custody after an arrest because
the person is too poor to deposit a monetary sum set by a bail schedule.”).
122
See e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 510.30 (McKinney 2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-63c (West 1968).
123
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 510.30 (McKinney 2012) (emphasis added).
124
Carlson, supra note 20, at 16-17.
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these statutes have been criticized due to their absence in requiring
judges to address an indigent individual’s financial status.125 Critics
of such statutes often turn to jurisdictions such as Washington,
D.C.—a jurisdiction which prides itself on not detaining persons
solely due to their inability to afford bail126––or Arkansas, a
jurisdiction that explicitly states that “[t]he judicial officer shall set
money bail only after he determines that no other conditions will
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant in court.”127
III. DEFINING “EXCESSIVE BAIL” THROUGH STATE BAIL REFORM &
SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION
Determining the legality of the adverse models and the best
practices of the meretricious ones is of the utmost importance.
Currently, it is estimated that 70 percent of our local jail population
is being detained without a conviction.128 Municipal and county jails
are overflowing with detainees simply because they cannot post
bail.129 This is not a new phenomenon. In 1964, Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy, testifying in front of a Senate subcommittee on
improvements to “judicial machinery,” noted that, “[o]n a single
day . . . there were 1,300 persons being held prior to trial in the Los
Angeles County jail. In St. Louis, 79 percent of all defendants [were]
detained because they [could not] raise bail. In Baltimore the figure
[was] 75 percent.”130 More than fifty years later, Attorney General
125

See JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., THE STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY 2013 at 4 (2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/SOJ2013.pdf. Jonathan Lippman, the Chief Judge of New York State discusses the
“need to ensure judges have accurate and complete information” before making
bail determinations, that courts must require indigence as a factor in determining
bail, and that the state must reform the bail bond industry as well. Id.
126
Marimow, supra note 93.
127
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9.2 (West 2014).
128
See PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, MASS INCARCERATION: THE
WHOLE PIE 2017, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (2017) (available at https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html).
129
See Katy Reckdahl, Jailed Without Conviction: Behind Bars for Lack of
Money, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA
/Justice/2012/1216/Jailed-without-conviction-Behind-bars-for-lack-of-money.
130
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, TESTIMONY BY ATT’Y GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY
ON BAIL LEGIS. BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEES ON CONST. RIGHTS AND
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Loretta Lynch continued to highlight this injustice. Addressing a
White House convention on incarceration and poverty Lynch stated,
“[w]hen bail is set unreasonably high, people are behind bars only
because they are poor.”131 Combating this problem is not a one-step
solution; it requires state legislatures and controlling precedent from
the Supreme Court to create an equitable result.
A. Progress Through State Bail Reform
Grappling with equitable bail determinations has been a difficult
issue for states.132 Typically, to determine bail when there is no bail
schedule in place, the accused—with, or often without, the
assistance of counsel—will present factors including the seriousness
of the charge, prior criminal history, and the health or well-being of
any potential victim.133 If the accused is bailable—which has
traditionally been the case for low-level, misdemeanor offenses—
the judicial officer will then consider general background
information regarding the accused, whether there are supervisory
methods in place if the defendant is released pending trial, and the
state’s interest in pretrial detention.134 Using this information, the
judicial officer is to make a reasonable bail determination or release

IMPROVEMENTS TO JUDICIAL MACHINERY OF S. JUDICIARY COMM.1 (1964),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf.
131
LORETTA LYNCH, ATT’Y GEN. LORETTA E. LYNCH DELIVERS REMARKS
AT WHITE HOUSE CONVENING ON INCARCERATION AND POVERTY (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-deliversremarks-white-house-convening-incarceration-and.
132
See, e.g., BRIAN FROSH, LETTER TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (2016) (describing the Attorney General of
Maryland writing to the Maryland rule-making committee with concerns that their
bail practices may be unconstitutional); Lippman, supra note 125, at 4 (discussing
the “need to ensure judges have accurate and complete information” before
making bail determinations).
133
See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM HARV. L. SCH., MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 28 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.
edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf [hereinafter CRIM. JUST.].
134
See Michael S. Woodruff, Note, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving
Pretrial Justice Reform Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 255
(2013) (describing the bail procedure).
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the accused on their own recognizance.135 The subjective nature of
this approach has led to varying results at the local level.136 In
attempting to grapple with the issue, states have started to think
about innovative alternatives for determining bail, some more
praiseworthy than others. The below discussion provides a brief
background of how states and communities have used innovative
approaches to alleviate the assignment of excessive bail.
1. Bail Schedules
As discussed, bail schedules were originally seen as a way of
standardizing the bail assignment process.137 Proponents of such
procedures argue that they provide a “speedy and convenient”
method of release and a financial incentive to comply with the
conditions of their release.138 These bail schedules developed during
a boom in the cash bail bond business.139 Often imposing cash
bonds, mandatory bail schedule statutes have required the accused
to pay these bonds as a surety that they would stand trial.140 Thus,
although argued by some as unconstitutional per se,141 bail
135

See CRIM. JUST., supra note 133.
See generally Fern L. Kletter, Excessiveness of Bail in State Criminal
Cases$Amounts Over $500,000, 7 A.L.R.6TH 487 (2005), LexisNexis
(describing various factors, through case by case analysis, that the judiciary uses
to determine proper bail); MATRIX OF STATE BAIL LAWS, supra note 17 (detailing
how different bail practices are in the fifty states).
137
See Assemb. B. 1118, 2014 S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2014); see also 17 N.J. PRAC., § 13:5 (2005) and accompanying text, supra note
19.
138
Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, at *37 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).
139
See JUSTICE POLICY INSTIT., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL
BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL
JUSTICE (Sept. 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/ _for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf.
140
See JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE
PRACTICE
OF
USING
MONEY
FOR
BAIL
9,
(Sept.
2012),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf.
141
Anthony G. Amsterdam et. al., Arranging Bail for the Criminal
Defendant, 18 PRACTICAL LAWYER 15, 19 (1972) (arguing bail schedules are per
se unconstitutional).
136
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schedules or schemes were considered an early positive innovation
in attempting to achieve equitable bail.142
While bail schedules may have been viewed as an early attempt
at providing more equitable bail determinations, they were largely
unsuccessful, resulting in an alleged “wealth-based detention
system.”143 An inability to pay these often-mandatory amounts has
led to several further innovations in bail reform. For example, and
further indicating the monetary role bail has played in criminal
justice, “bail funds” have recently been created to alleviate the
burden of excessive bail amounts.144
2. Bail Funds
Bail funds allow individuals to pool their money together to pay
for the bail of those who would otherwise be detained pretrial.145
The governing rules of bail funds vary, but their general purpose is
the same: they are created to pay for the release of low-risk
defendants.146 Once a defendant who has been sponsored by the
142

See generally OKLAHOMAN, supra note 90 (examining how counties in
Oklahoma have different bail practices).
143
Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, at *63 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).
144
See Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren’t Waiting for Bail Reform, They’re
Using Charity to Set Poor Defendants Free, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-aren-t-waitingfor-bail-reform#.Gm65qvI31.
145
See, e.g., How The Fund Works, BROOKLYN COMMUNITY BAIL FUND,
https://brooklynbailfund.org/how-it-works/ (last visited May 26, 2017)
(describing their mission to “pool money to pay bail for fellow New Yorkers”).
146
See, e.g., Our Mission, CHICAGO COMMUNITY BAIL FUND,
https://www.chicagobond.org/ (last visited May 26, 2017) (considering, among
other criteria, the existing support, risk of victimization in the jail, and special
health needs of a defendant); How it works, MASS. BAIL FUND,
http://www.massbailfund.org/how-it-works.html (last visited May 26, 2017)
(accepting “referrals for clients represented by court-appointed counsel whose
bail is $500.00 or less”); Community Bail Funds Reclaim Bail Decision Power,
PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.pretrial.org/community-bailfunds-reclaim-bail-decision-power/ (describing the correlation between low-risk
defendants paying bail funds and the increased likelihood of showing up for court
appearances) [hereinafter Community Bail Funds]. Bail evaluations create risk
assessments based on the criteria judicial officers and officers of the court
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fund stands trial the money is repaid to the fund.147 These funds are
typically created by municipalities who finance them by
appropriating a part of the public budget, or are funded through
community groups who raise money from their peers and whose
members make personal contributions to the fund.148
Municipal legislators claim that the use of public money is wellspent because of the typically high cost of detaining an inmate.149
Additionally, at least one criminal justice scholar has argued that
community bail funds should be seen as a means of nullification,
arguing that “[e]ach time a community bail fund pays bail for a
stranger, the people in control of the fund reject a judge’s
determination that a certain amount of the defendant’s personal
money was necessary for the defendant’s release.”150 This type of
grassroots organizing and civil auditing should be an indication to
the courts that excessive bail has a substantial impact on the
community at large. Though helpful, bail funds are only a solution
for providing financial assistance for those low-risk defendants
eligible after bail has already been imposed—these funds do not
consider. Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at *27. Low-risk assessments are for petty
crimes or crimes with no malice, and indicate likelihood to attend at trial. See,
e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICHIGAN L. REV. 585, 600–602
(2017) (providing examples of such low-level cases funds will address.) These
risk-assessments are arbitrary however, when blanket bail is assigned and some
are able to bail while others are not. See, e.g., Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at
*28–30 (describing the arbitrary nature of the Harris County scoring system).
147
Community Bail Funds, supra note 146.
148
Compare John Surico, New York City is Creating a Bail Fund to Help
Get People Out of Jail, VICE (June 29, 2015), http://www.vice.com/read/newyork-city-is-creating-a-bail-fund-to-help-people-get-out-of-jail-629 (depicting
$1.4 million from the NYC budget allocated for the start of the fund), with Matt
Sledge, Community Bail Fund For Poor Defendants to Launch in Brooklyn,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/17/
brooklyn-community-bail-fund_n_6886836. html (examining the start of the
nonprofit fund). But see Erin Durkin & Reuven Blau, New York City bail relief
for low-level detainees in limbo after introduced in 2015, N.Y. DAILYNEWS (Dec.
4, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/new-york-city-bail-relieflow-level-detainees-limbo-article-1.2898723 (declaring that the NYC fund has
not distributed any money to detainees a year after its creation).
149
See Surico, supra note 148 (claiming it costs $450 per day to detain an
NYC inmate and the average pretrial inmate stay is 24 days).
150
Simonson, supra note 146, at 588.
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address the problem of why excessive bails are so often imposed in
the first place. Attempting to make more accurate bail assignments,
some states have turned to bail algorithms.
3. Bail Algorithms
Bail algorithms, through computer programming, assess
questions answered by an arrestee and use that analysis in
conjunction with the arrestee’s criminal record to recommend a riskanalysis of the arrestee.151 Bail algorithms are geared toward more
accurately determining bail amounts based on a number of factors
traditionally left to judges’ discretion.152 Representatives from the
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which has created a bail
algorithm used in thirty jurisdictions, have justified it as a way “to
provide judges with objective, data-driven, consistent information
that can inform the decisions [judicial officers] make.”153 Through
machine learning, the Arnold Foundation bail algorithm is able to
process data from 1.5 million case histories, as well as other
information, and then provide predictive risk-assessments
pertaining to a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism or missing
trial.154
Bail algorithms are a relatively new innovation, and their
implementation has been slow.155 Though sparsely used, bail

151

Jason Tashea, Risk-assessment Algorithms Challenged in Bail,
Sentencing and Parole Decisions, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole/?.
152
See Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail
in New York, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html.
153
Vivian Ho, Seeking a Better Bail System, SF Turns to Computer
Algorithm, S.F. CHRONICLE (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime
/article/Seeking-a-better-bail-system-SF-turns-to-8899654.php.
154
See id.
155
See Christopher I. Haugh, The White House Has a New Data-Driven
Criminal-Justice Project, ATLANTIC (Jun. 30, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/06/white-house-data-criminal-justice/489614/; see also Of
Prediction and Policy, ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.economist
.com/news/finance-and-economics/21705329-governments-have-much-gain-app
lying-algorithms-public-policy (noting various barriers that may affect
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algorithms have already been criticized by legal commentators and
practitioners.156 It is argued that bail algorithms not only limit the
discretion of the judicial officer and prescribe bail amounts that are
excessive by traditional standards, but in some circumstances they
have also been considered biased toward certain races.157 These
algorithms do not use race in their evaluation explicitly, but do
consider factors which, in practice, impact specific races.158 As
such, these algorithms, while providing informed data, still result in
inaccurate bail determinations and the assignment of excessive
bail.159 While enduring criticism, bail algorithms can at least be seen
as a positive step toward case-by-case bail determinations.
4. Pretrial Services
Furthering efforts to make case-by-case determinations while
simultaneously attempting to make bail attainable has been the
development of Pretrial Service Agencies (“PSAs”).160 PSAs are

nationwide implementation include, transparency, data-fetching, and ethical
issues).
156
See ANGÈLE CHRISTIN ET AL., COURTS AND PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS,
DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW ERA OF POLICING AND JUSTICE (2015),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Angele%20Christi
n.pdf.
157
See Gretel Kauffman, Courts Use Risk Algorithms to Set Bail: A Step
Toward a More Just System?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 3, 2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0803/Courts-use-risk-algorithmsto-set-bail-A-step-toward-a-more-just-system; see also Sam Corbett-Davies et al.,
A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled
Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-analgorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/ (noting that
ProPublica, allege that the COMPAS algorithm is “biased against black
defendants”).
158
See Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 157 (“For example, black defendants
are more likely to have prior arrests, and since prior arrests predict reoffending,
the algorithm flags more black defendants as high risk even though it does not use
race in the classification.”).
159
Tashea, supra note 151.
160
See Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventative Detention Through
Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act,
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governmental agencies designed to aid judicial officers, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys in making more accurate bail requests and
generally increasing the efficiency of pretrial procedures.161 The
general responsibilities of a PSA are the same: they provide support
through mechanisms such as recommendations to the court after
interviews with the defendant, risk assessments, and defendant
supervision.162 These services have been proven to lead to more
accurately assigned bail amounts, have made bail more attainable
for alleged defendants, and have increased trial efficiency.163
In addition to improving the desired effects of bail, pretrial
services have lowered the cost of pretrial inmate detention.164 A
study by the U.S. courts showed that in 2012, pretrial detention cost
$73.03 per day, but pretrial supervision cost the government $7.24
per day.165 Similarly, a 2012 study issued for California County
Courts showed that Santa Clara County’s Pretrial Service Program
saved them $32 million per year.166 Thus, since their inception,
localities have used pretrial services as a method of keeping pretrial
detention inmate numbers low, lowering budget costs, and
increasing trial attendance rates.167
Pretrial services are not a new innovation, and may be traced
back to the Manhattan Bail Project and the beginning of the bail

97 Yale L.J. 320, 321 (1987); see also Marimow, supra note 93 (detailing the
procedures in D.C. courts aimed at progressing pretrial release).
161
Woodruff, supra note 134 at 253.
162
See id.
163
See Marimow, supra note 93 (discussing the statistical accomplishments
of Washington, D.C.’s pretrial release services program, in lieu of a monetary bail
program, with respect to trial attendance of criminal defendants released on
nonfinancial bail).
164
See generally P’SHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, PRETRIAL DETENTION &
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION––BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR CALIFORNIA
COUNTIES (Sharon Aungst ed., 2012) (describing lowered costs in California
County jails that have strong pretrial service practices); Supervision Costs, supra
note 109 (detailing the sharp decrease in spending by using pretrial service
techniques).
165
Supervision Costs, supra note 109.
166
P’SHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, supra note 164, at 4.
167
See VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14, at iv-v.
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reform movement.168 From 1960 to 1967, the Manhattan Bail
Project researched the impact of pretrial services and their effect on
ensuring a defendant’s appearance at trial.169 Their research clearly
showed that pretrial services were more impactful than monetary
bail assignments.170 Because of their success, pretrial services are
now required at the federal level,171 but have mostly failed to trickle
down to counties and municipalities.172 States which do provide
such services typically allow counties to administer them on their
own, which has led to a general lack of cohesion.173
Additionally, even in jurisdictions that do offer pretrial services,
their methods have been criticized as inadequate.174 For example, in
Harris County, Texas, bail hearings are often conducted later than
their twenty-four-hour postarrest requirement, lack pertinent
information such as the arrestee’s financials, and are held without

168

PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION
MAKING: MOVING FROM A CASH-BASE TO RISK-BASED PROCESS 12 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Rationaland-Transparent-Bail-Decision-Making.pdf.
169
S. Andrew Schaffer, BAIL AND PAROLE JUMPING IN MANHATTAN IN 1967,
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1970) https://storage.googleapis.com/veraweb-assets/downloads/Publications/bail-and-parole-jumping-in-manhattan-in1967/legacy_downloads/Bail_and_parole_jumping.pdf.
170
See id.
171
See 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (2008).
172
See Woodruff, supra note 134, at 254–57 (discussing nonreformist states
and the failure to incorporate pretrial services at the state level).
173
Id. See, e.g., P’SHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, supra note 166 (advocating
for California counties to institute pretrial release programs as a result of state
legislation that has moved “non-serious, non-violent, and non-sex offenders
formerly sentenced to state prisons” to counties jailhouses in order to avoid
overcrowding); Johnson & Johnson, supra note 109, at 42 (discussing problems
of overcrowding in the Harris County jail system due to overcrowding of pretrial
detainees who cannot afford bail and advocating the County to, among other
things, expand the application of nonfinancial release bonds by focusing efforts
on individualized pretrial release programs).
174
See, e.g., Edie Fortuna Cimino et al., Charm City Televised &
Dehumanized: How CCTV Bail Reviews Violate Due Process, 45 U. BALT. L.F.
56 (2014) (depicting the shortcomings of pretrial services in Baltimore,
Maryland).
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an appropriate opportunity to be heard.175 Furthermore, some
criminal justice advocates have spoken out about the invasiveness
of pretrial services which frequently require adherence to drug
testing or GPS monitoring.176 This has been criticized as a method
of policing a population in their homes or communities rather than
in jail––often at the arrestee’s expense.177
Although criticized,178 pretrial services are beneficial because
they provide judicial officers with detailed circumstances of each
defendant’s case so they may make more accurate bail
determinations. Thus, pretrial services go a long way in ensuring
excessive bail amounts are not imposed and––when administered
successfully––pretrial service administrators can pride themselves
on not detaining alleged criminals simply because they cannot
pay.179 The success of PSAs has led bail reform advocates to push
for such agencies in all states.180
B. Clarity Through Supreme Court Intervention
Alone, these innovations will not end the excessive bail
epidemic. As noted above, bail reform advocates and legal
commentators have declared that state bail procedures violate the

175

See, e.g., Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-141420, 2017 WL 1735456,
at *23-53 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017) (describing arbitrary pretrial service practices
in Harris County and the defendants’ refutation that this process is insufficient).
176
See, e.g., 13th (Netflix 2016) (declaring that, “What I worry about is that
we fall asleep at the wheel and that we wake up and we are incarcerating people
in our communities”); 13th – Reflections & Loose Transcript, VIALOGUE (Oct.
29, 2016), https://vialogue.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/13th-reflections-loosetranscript/. But see Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be
Monitored, 123 YALE. L.J. 1344, 1350 (arguing that pretrial monitoring is a far
greater option than pretrial detention).
177
13th, supra note 176 (declaring that, “[p]risons would be imbedded in our
homes, so folks wouldn’t be locked up in a cage—in a cell inside an institution—
but they would have ankle bracelets on.”).
178
See, e.g., Cimino et al., supra note 174.
179
See Reckdahl, supra note 129.
180
Woodruff, supra note 134, at 255 (examining which jurisdictions offer
pretrial services).
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administration of justice for a multitude of reasons.181 These state
procedural schemes have been the subject of several legal
challenges, and recent rulings have suggested a positive shift
towards recognizing bail reform.182 For example, in 2015, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a statement of interest
(“SOI”) in Varden v. City of Clanton.183 The DOJ argued that the
city’s use of a mandatory bail scheme, without consideration for
indigence, violated the Fourteenth Amendment and was contrary to
public policy.184 The plaintiffs’ argument emphasized the
Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection, particularly
as it pertains to pretrial liberty.185 The City of Clanton reacted to
#arden’s claims by revising its mandatory bail schedule provision
to consider indigence.186 Alabama then revised its state statute to
specifically account for defendants’ financial condition when
assigning bail.187 However, as litigation and legislation moves
forward, those unable to pay bail remain in wait. Reforms have been
furthered by states through legislative action and legal challenges,188
181

See, e.g., VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14, at xiii (identifying causes of
case processing delays); Lippman, supra note 125, at 4–7 (reflecting on bail
practices which adversely impact the poor); Carlson, supra note 20, at 12
(depicting the Supreme Court’s overview of excessive bail legal issues).
182
See Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton,
No. 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC, 2015 WL 5387219 at *8 (2015) [hereinafter,
Varden SOI] (addressing “bail schemes” in Alabama which require alleged
criminals to pay a cash bond in a fixed dollar amount for each charge,
misdemeanor or felony, or else remain incarcerated); see also Walker v. City of
Calhoun, No. 16-10521, 2016 WL 361612, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (addressing a
violation of indigent individual’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and how pretrial
detention can impede the fair administration of justice).
183
See Varden SOI, supra note 182.
184
Id. at *1 (stating, “any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of prefixed amounts for different offenses in order to gain pretrial release, without any
regard for indigence, not only violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, but also constitutes bad public policy.”).
185
Id. at 8.
186
See Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34, 2015 WL 5387219, at *4
(M.D. Ala., Sept. 14, 2015) (following an individual-by-individual standard).
187
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(A)(13).
188
See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Bail Reform Bill Clears Senate, Heads to
Malloy’s Desk, US NEWS (June 7, 2017) https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/connecticut/articles/2017-06-07/bail-reform-bill-clears-senate-heads-to-
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but without a Supreme Court ruling defining the prohibitions on
excessive bail, courts throughout the country will continue to
interpret this clause arbitrarily at worst, and inconsistently at best.
To date, the only Supreme Court case to consider an excessive
bail amount is Stack, in which the Court ruled that the blanket
procedure used to determine bail was a violation of the Excessive
Bail Clause.189 In Stack and the cases that followed, the Court failed
to establish an appropriate test, yet mentioned in dicta that “[t]o infer
from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high
amount is an arbitrary act”190 and that “[i]f bail in an amount greater
than that usually fixed for serious charges is required in the case of
any [arrestee], that is a matter to which evidence should be directed
in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each [arrestee] may
be preserved.”191 The Court remanded the case for the lower court
to fix “reasonable bail” but did not identify factors to determine such
reasonableness.192 Thus, in an effort to prevent “flood[ing] the
courts with motions and appeals in bail cases,”193 and by narrowly
responding to the legal questions before them,194 the Court failed to
establish appropriate excessive bail precedent.195
Though excessive bail precedent is lacking, Justice Jackson was
clear that the Court should not “exercise [their] certiorari power in
individual cases except where they are typical of a problem so
malloys-desk (describing steps Connecticut is taking to change bail procedures);
Michael Kunzelman, Lawsuit: Bail ‘Scheme’ Keeps Poor People Jailed for
Months, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (June 6, 2017) http://www.sfchronicle.com
/news/crime/article/Lawsuit-Bail-scheme-keeps-poor-people-jailed11199374.php (discussing a court challenge in Louisiana to a county’s “wealthbased detention system”).
189
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951). The Court did not discuss the
procedural process of the bail assignments save to say that the district court
imposed a “uniform amount.” Id.
190
Id. at 6.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 7.
193
Id. at 11.
194
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
195
See United States v. Gardner, 523 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(expressing a lack of guidance pertaining to pretrial release conditions). See, e.g.,
Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating the lack
of frequency the Supreme Court has considered the Excessive Bail clause).
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important and general as to deserve the attention of supervisory
power.”196 Today, excessive bail is such a problem.197 The Court
should exercise their supervisory power198 by granting certiorari in
Walker v. City of Calhoun and Odonnell v. Harris County, Texas; in
doing so, the Court should answer important questions of law
pertaining to excessive bail.
1. Walker v. City of Calhoun
On September 3, 2015, the Calhoun Police Department arrested
fifty-four-year-old Maurice Walker for “being a pedestrian under
the influence.”199 Walker, who is disabled, had been living on just
$540 per month in Social Security benefits.200 Unable to afford the
mandatory $160 cash bond, Maurice stayed in jail for six days prior

196

Stack, 342 U.S. at 13 (Jackson, J.) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court
granted certiorari in Salerno “because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.”
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. This conflict is persistent today and warrants clarity by
the Court.
197
See Odonnell, 2016 WL 7337549 at *8 (“According to a 2012 report, 81
percent of misdemeanor arrestees in Harris County could not post bail at booking
and were jailed. Most of the other 19 percent could pay and were released on bond
before or at booking.”); see also Pinto, supra note 12 (describing the impact
detention on bail has on the innocent and indigent).
198
The Supreme Court will rarely remove a case before an appeals court
opinion is issued. They will only do so “upon a showing that the case is of such
imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate
practice and to require immediate determination [by the] Court.” SUP. CT. R. 11.
However, as discussed below, Walker has recently been adjudicated by the 11th
Circuit and the Odonnell case is similar and important enough to be joined as a
companion case. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. This would not be an
unprecedented reaction by the Supreme Court; coincidentally, the Court took such
an action in Roe v. Wade when a Texas statute and a Georgia statute challenged
the imperative rights of Due Process and Equal protection. See SUSAN REACH
WINTERS & THOMAS BALDWIN, 12 N.J. PRAC., FAM. LAW PRAC. § 54.23 (last
updated Nov. 2016).
199
Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, 2016 WL 361612 at *1 (N.D. Ga.,
2016).
200
Id.
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to appearing in front of a Municipal Court judge.201 Maurice filed a
class action lawsuit and asked the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia to determine whether the city’s
mandatory bail schedule violated the Fourteenth Amendment.202
The district court granted standing to Walker’s class203 and
found that the bail schedule violated the Equal Protection Clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not account for
indigence.204 The court issued an injunction to cease the use of the
bail schedule.205 It also mandated that the city “implement postarrest procedures that comply with the Constitution.”206 The court
definitively stated that the City of Calhoun “may not continue to
keep arrestees in its custody for any amount of time solely because
the arrestees cannot afford bail.”207 A Supreme Court ruling of this
nature would greatly impact and possibly end the use of bail
schedules in counties across the country.
In February 2017, the Eleventh Circuit granted an appeal by the
City of Calhoun and ruled in the City’s favor, vacating the district
court’s order because it did not comport with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rule 65 (requiring an injunction to be sufficiently specific
and detailed).208 Because the circuit court remanded the case for lack
of specificity, they did not address the constitutionality of the City
201

Feds Say That It’s Unfair to Hold Poor Defendants If They Can’t Afford
Bail, FORTUNE (2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/20/poor-defendants-bail/
(exploring Walker’s circumstance).
202
Complaint, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-170, 2016 WL
361612, at *9–10 (2016).
203
Walker, 2016 WL 361612 at *2–3, 12 (discussing and certifying standing
of the plaintiff class and finding that standing and mootness issues raised by
Defendant did not affect Plaintiff’s claim because there is often no injury at the
time of trial in bail cases).
204
Id. at 10 (ruling that City of Calhoun bail schedule and post-arrest release
procedures were directly at odds with the excessive bail clause because they did
not provide a means for indigent individuals to be released within a reasonable
period after arrest).
205
Id. at 14.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 14.
208
Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 16–10521, 2017 WL 929750 at *1 (2017)
(ruling that the district court’s injunction was an “obey the law” injunction and
was overly vague, and therefore should not be enforced).
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of Calhoun’s bail schedule procedures; however, in their appeal, the
City of Calhoun argued that strict scrutiny review does not apply to
an indigent class and that the bail schedule in place is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.209 The appellants also
claimed that “principles of Federalism afford municipalities the
flexibility to employ different pretrial procedures” and that the city’s
practices are within that flexible boundary.210 Finally, the City
argued that their legislature-imposed bail schedule did not interfere
with the discretion of the judicial officer in setting bail amounts.211
The City of Calhoun was joined by “interested parties” such as
neighboring municipalities in Georgia, as well as organizations like
the Georgia Sherriff’s Association, the American Bail Coalition, and
Bail USA, Inc.212 On the appellee’s side, “interested parties”
providing amicus briefs or representation were groups such as the
Department of Justice, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Cato
Institute, and the Pretrial Justice Institute.213 The sheer number of
interested parties on both sides and the dire circumstances of the
appellee-plaintiffs should indicate the importance of supervision by
the Supreme Court.214 The Court should answer several important
questions pertaining to excessive bail, such as: (1) whether
mandatory bail schedules are per se unconstitutional, (2) whether
judicial officers must consider the financial status of a defendant
when fixing bail, and (3) whether legislatively enacted bail
schedules infringe upon a judicial officer’s discretion.215
2. Odonnell v. Harris County, Texas
In Odonnell, a more recent case filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, the joint plaintiffs brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action after being held on bail amounts that ranged
209

Reply Brief of Appellant City of Calhoun at *14–17, Walker v. City of
Calhoun, No. 16-10521, 2016 WL 5368508 (11th Cir. 2017).
210
Id. at 9–11.
211
Id. at 19.
212
Id. at C-1–C-5.
213
Id; Walker, 2017 WL 929750, at *1.
214
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951) (considering bail procedures to
be an important factor in criminal justice.).
215
See Walker, 2017 WL 929750 at *1–3.
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from $2,500 to $5,000.216 None of the plaintiffs were able to pay,
and were detained between two and five days prior to their bail
hearings.217 Odonnell raises many analogous themes to Walker and
Varden,218 but has also raised distinct questions of law important to
excessive bail jurisprudence.219
The arrestees in Odonnell argued that their bail was assigned at
amounts much higher than they were able to pay, creating a “wealthbased detention system.”220 Harris County—home of one of the
largest municipal jails in the United States and infamous for
overcrowding—first argued for a stay until they could implement
bail reforms set to begin in July 2017.221 The district court judge
dismissed Harris County’s motion, and issued an early ruling in
favor of the plaintiff’s equal protection and due process claims.222
In April 2017, leaving little risk to be overruled due to a lack of
specificity and detail, Judge Lee H. Rosenthal issued a 193-page
opinion in favor of the Odonnell plaintiff class, establishing an
injunction on Harris County’s bail practices.223 Judge Rosenthal’s
lengthy ruling attempted to answer a narrow question pertaining to
the circumstances of the plaintiff’s case. The ruling only addressed
misdemeanor offenses committed by indigent individuals who were
216

Odonnell v. Harris Cty, No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *7–9 (S.D.
Tex. Hous. Div. 2016).
217
After their bail hearings, each defendant’s bail was either reduced or they
were released with a sentence of time served. Id. at 7–8.
218
See, e.g., Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, at
*21 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017) (discussing how lawyers in Varden also represented
Odonnell plaintiff class).
219
See Id. at 1–3 (raising questions like Walker).
220
Id.
221
Cameron Langford, Judge Won’t Buy Harris County’s Defense of Bail
System, COURTHOUSENEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.courthousenews.com
/judge-wont-buy-harris-countys-defense-of-bail-system/.
222
Odonnell, 2016 WL 7337549 at *38–39; Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at
*73–74.
223
Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at *85; Eli Rosenberg, Judge in Houston
Strikes Down Harris County’s Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/us/judge-strikes-down-harris-county-bailsystem.html?_r=0 (“If a judge is willing to take the time to have the hearing and
put out a 193-page order, it’s sort of hard to imagine her coming out the other way
down the line.”).
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detained pretrial solely due to an inability to afford a monetary bail
amount.224 The opinion issued an injunction on the county’s bail
practices and ordered the release of any such person who was being
held.225 The county appealed the decision and filed a motion to stay
the injunction while on appeal.226 The county then filed an
emergency review with Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas,
who denied the request, allowing the injunction to go into effect.227
Given the hotly contested issues in the case, it is likely the appellants
may still seek Supreme Court review pending appeal, and the Court
should grant certiorari.228
Intervention by the Supreme Court would allow the Justices to
address questions such as: (1) the standard of review for indigent
individuals bringing equal protection claims,229 (2) the extent
pretrial hearings must go to adhere to procedural due rocess
standards in determining bail,230 and (3) the federal courts’
requirement to abstain from hearing challenges to bail cases.231

224

Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at *2. The judge in Odonnell wrote,
The question addressed in this Memorandum and Opinion is
narrow: whether the plaintiffs have met their burden of showing
a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims and the
other factors necessary for a preliminary injunction against
Harris County’s policies and practices of imposing secured
money bail on indigent misdemeanor defendants. Id.
225
See id. at *83–90 (detailing the injunction).
226
Memorandum and Order Denying Stay, Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas,
No. H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1956736 at *1.
227
Mihir Zaveri and Andrew Kragie, Harris County Takes Bail Suit to U.S.
Supreme Court, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (June 6, 2017). http://www.houston
chronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-takes-bail-suit
-to-U-S-Supreme-11200974.php (detailing the county’s attempt to halt the release
of inmates).
228
See Ilya Shapiro and Devin Watkins, Even Poor People Should Be
Allowed to Make Bail, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 10, 2017)
https://www.cato.org/blog/even-poor-people-should-be-allowed-make-bail.
229
See Odonnell, 2017 WL 1735456 at *83–90 (expressing a remedy).
230
See id. at 32 (detailing an arbitrary pretrial process in bail determinations).
231
See Odonnell v. Harris Cty, No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *11,
18–21 (S.D. Tex. Hous. Div. 2016).
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3. Accurately Defining Excessive Bail
Most importantly, the Court should take the opportunity to use
both cases to provide clear guidelines regarding how to define
“excessive bail.” An adequate resolution of these issues would rule
that mandatory bail schedules are per se unconstitutional under
existing Supreme Court precedent. In Stack, Justice Jackson, in his
concurrence, declared that it was a clear violation of FRCP 46(c) if
a court fixes a “uniform blanket bail” based on the nature of the
accusation and without considering “the difference in circumstances
between different defendants.”232 Justice Jackson went on to state,
“[e]ach defendant stands before the bar of justice as an
individual;”233 because mandatory bail schedules do not provide the
defendant with that opportunity, they should be ruled per se
unconstitutional.234
If mandatory bail schedules are ruled per se unconstitutional, the
onus will likely shift again toward judicial discretion in assigning
reasonable bail.235 Bail schemes are justifiable in assisting judicial
officers making bail determinations, but the Supreme Court should
clarify that these schemes must allow the judicial officer to consider
individual defendants’ financial status, among other factors, and that
the judicial officer––not the legislature––has the ultimate discretion

232

Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (Jackson, J.).
Id.
234
See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 WL
361612, at *10 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (echoing the DOJ’s Varden SOI, the court
declared, “[a]ny bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts
for different offenses to obtain pretrial release, without any consideration of
indigence or other factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause); Varden SOI,
supra note 182; Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2
(2015) (N.D. Ala. 2015) (finding a practice of not considering indigence
unconstitutional on an equal protection basis).
235
See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 1180 (who concluded that the only consistent historical interpretation
of the clause was “protection from pretrial detention . . . secured against
abridgment by legislation or the vagaries of judicial discretion”). Foote’s opus
predicted the excessive bail epidemic and is heavily praised by bail scholars. See,
e.g., Candace McCoy, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine Mostly
Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135 (2007).
233
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in assigning bail.236 Under this interpretation, courts would find that
the City of Calhoun, Harris County, and similar jurisdictions using
rigid fixed bail procedures, or informal arbitrary ones, do not
provide adequate means for indigent individuals to be released
within a reasonable amount of time.237 This is a violation of Due
Process and Equal Protection because an inability to pay an
excessive bail causes a de facto detention which is a deprivation of
liberty and impairs a defendant’s presumption of innocence.
Defendants’ impaired presumption of innocence and a
deterioration of their right to be free pending trial are precisely what
Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Black and Marshall warned of in
Stack, Carlson, and Salerno.238 In Stack, Chief Justice Vinson wrote
“[the] traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”239 In Carlson,
Justice Black declared, “[t]he plain purpose of our bail Amendment
was to make it impossible [for any agency] to authorize keeping
people imprisoned a moment longer than was necessary.”240 And in
Salerno, Justice Marshall poignantly wrote,
236

See, e.g., FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE, supra note 105 (showing a Los
Angeles County bail schedule which requires certain minimum amounts but also
provides “the amount of bail . . . shall lie with the sound discretion of the judicial
officer before whom the defendant appeared”).
237
See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *10.
238
See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless [the] right to
bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 763 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring “[t]he majority’s
untenable conclusion that the present Act is constitutional arises from a specious
denial of the role of the Bail Clause and the Due Process Clause in protecting the
invaluable guarantee afforded by the presumption of innocence.”). See also
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 552 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“For the
bureau agent is not required to prove that a person he throws in jail is an alien, or
a Communist, or ‘dangerous.’ The agent need only declare he has reason to
believe that such is the case. The agent may be and here apparently was acting on
the rankest hearsay evidence.”).
239
Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
240
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 557.
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[h]onoring the presumption of innocence is often
difficult; sometimes we must pay substantial social
costs as a result of our commitment to the values we
espouse. But at the end of the day the presumption of
innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we
take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure
only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately,
ourselves.241
Even Justice Rehnquist––one of the most conservative Justices
to sit on the bench––wrote that bail conditions should be balanced
against “the individual’s strong interest in liberty.”242 Justice
Rehnquist, with whom the entire bench agreed, went on to declare
that an individual’s liberty may only be deprived “in circumstances
where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty” as shown
by clear and convincing evidence.243 Individuals such as Kalief
Browder, Maurice Walker, and Maranda Odonnell are being
detained not for a “sufficiently weighty” government interest proven
by clear and convincing evidence; they are detained because a
failure in our judicial machinery has resulted in the imposition of
excessive bail amounts. This failure warrants clarification from the
Supreme Court, which should build upon the meager balancing test
of the Salerno Court.
In Salerno, the Court also agreed that a substantive limitation of
the Bail Clause is that a “proposed condition of release or detention
not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil,” and to determine
an excessive response:
[the Court] must compare that response against the
interest the Government seeks to protect by means of
that response. Thus, when the Government has
admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight,
bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to
ensure that goal, and no more.244
To more appropriately adjudicate the Excessive Bail Clause, the
Supreme Court should refine this definition and declare that:
241
242
243
244

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 767.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id. at 754.
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Where the Government has not shown a compelling
interest in pretrial detention by clear and convincing
evidence, bail must be set at an amount that should
ensure appearance at trial and may not be set in a
manner and at an amount that is unreasonable when
considering a defendant’s financial status. In
establishing a monetary amount, it is necessary for
judicial officers to consider financial status and not
impose an amount or condition which would result
in an undue burden upon the defendant.245
Such a test would ensure that courts would account for an
individual’s financial condition when considering postarrest bail
assignments, a requirement under the plain language of the
excessive bail clause. This would also ensure arrestees are not
detained simply because they cannot afford bail, preserving their
presumption of innocence and not restricting their defense.
CONCLUSION
Reasonable bail policies are a key component to reform in the
criminal justice system.246 As such, the administration of bail has
developed over the years through advocacy from criminal justice
groups, legislative action, common law, and inadequate
constitutional interpretation.247 To appropriately address this ill, the
Supreme Court should unequivocally rule that mandatory bail
schedules are unconstitutional. The Court should also set a higher
standard for legislatively enacted bail procedures, one that ensures
judicial officers have the discretion to make accurate bail
determinations.248
245

A ruling such as this is in line with other equal protection and due process
standards.
246
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (granting the petition for
certiorari to review “questions important to the administration of justice”).
247
See generally Helanie Greenfield, Bail, 79 GEO. L.J. 822 (discussing
statues that impose pretrial detention).
248
To make such determinations, judicial officers will likely require as much
information pertaining to the defendant as necessary. To provide such
information, jurisdictions should implement or improve Pretrial Service Agencies
(“PSAs”). Once bail amounts have been made more attainable, more conservative

"MAKING BAIL"

683

Pretrial detention solely due to an inability to post bail tends to
unjustly perpetuate criminality and poverty.249 Pressures from
pretrial detention not only have an impact because of a financial
burden to pay bail amounts, but can also lead to loss of employment,
housing, or even child custody.250 Additionally burdensome is the
adverse impact an individual’s detention has in pursuit of their
defense.251 For the accused, pretrial detention constrains legal
representation252 and vitiates a presumption of innocence.253 Thus,
indigent detainees frequently face an uphill battle for their defense
in a system that incentivizes them to admit guilt in exchange for their
release.254
states are likely to raise the debate regarding how much discretion states have in
defining bailable and unbailable alleged offenses. Because states have
traditionally had the discretion to define bailable and unbailable alleged offenses,
and because federal law pertaining to bail is seen as more liberal than state law,
there is likely to be a shift toward making more offenses unbailable. See
Amsterdam et al., supra note 141, at 19. This change in discussion is likely to
raise further policy issues regarding criminal classifications, community safety,
and principles of Federalism.
249
See Rabuy & Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail Perpetuates an
Endless Cycle of Poverty and Jail Time, PRISON POL’Y INST. (May 10, 2016),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html.
250
Pinto, supra note 12.
251
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 769 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (proposing pretrial detention may contradict the presumption of
innocence of the alleged criminal).
252
Amber Baylor, A Defense Counsel Challenge to Conditions in Pretrial
Confinement, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 8 (2015); Pinto, supra
note 12 (discussing how many clients a public defender represents); Rakoff, supra
note 85 (discussing limited visiting hours for counsel).
253
See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y. CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC.,
BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY CASE OUTCOMES, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 18 at 7
(2008), http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module=reports&module_
id=597 &doc_name=doc (examining the increased likelihood of conviction as it
relates to amount of imposed bail and pretrial detention).
254
See Jim Dwyer, A Life That Frayed as Bail Reform Withered, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/after-a-shockingdeath-a-renewed-plea-for-bail-reform-in-new-york-state.html?action=click&con
tentCollection=Magazine&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgty
pe=article (describing Kalief Browder’s legal challenges as he refused a plea and
the Chief Judge of New York State Court’s call for reform); Rakoff, supra note
85.
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State courts and legislatures have recently renewed hope that
reforms are on the rise.255 California has introduced legislation that
would practically abolish monetary bail256 and judges, while still
receiving public pressure,257 are taking a stance against the arbitrary
use of bail schedules by municipal officials.258 As advocates
continue to make progress, it is important that the Supreme Court
use its supervisory power to establish a clear precedent for excessive
bail.
To borrow a line of reasoning from Chief Justice Roberts, the
way to stop the imposition of excessive bail is to stop imposing
excessive bail.259 Until the Supreme Court administers a definitive
interpretation of the excessive bail clause, this responsibility rests
with judicial officers in municipal and county courts across the
country. Unfortunately for many indigent defendants today,
detention prior to trial or without trial is the norm, and pretrial liberty
is the carefully limited exception.260 As predicted by Justice
Marshall, the Salerno decision truly “[went] forth without authority,
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Alexei Koseff, California Would Virtually Eliminate Money Bail Under
Proposed Legislation, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.sacbee.co
m/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article14122949 3.html.
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See, e.g., Jon Fleishman, Fleischman: California ‘Bail Reform’
Legislation Aces Out Crime Victims, BREITBART (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/california/2017/04/20/bail-reform-legislation-aces-out
-crime-victims/ (claiming the proposed California legislation is too lenient on
criminals).
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See e.g., Ryan Collingwood, People’s Court Convicts Judges, BONNER
COUNTY DAILY BEE (Mar. 18, 2017), http://www.bonnercountydailybee.com
/front_page_slider/20170318/peoples_court_convicts_judges (detailing judges
who received hate mail after setting a lower bond in favor of Eighth Amendment).
258
See Tom Steele, Texas Man’s $4 Billion Bail Was Meant to be a
Statement, Says the Woman Who Set It, DALLAS NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017),
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Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
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and [came] back without respect.”261 The lack of authority has left
courts befuddled in how to assign bail262 and the lack of respect has
tarnished the defendant’s presumption of innocence and limited
their right to liberty before trial.263

261
262
263

Id. at 767.
Steele, supra note 260.
See Rakoff, supra note 85.

